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Bruce Ackerman on Interpretation: A Critique
Raoul Berger
The too familiar vice of the present age is to obtrude a s manifest truths, mere fancies, born of conjecture and superficial
reasoning, altogether unsupported by the testimony of sense.
William Harvey*

Bruce Ackerman's We the People1 has been hailed by Sanford Levinson as "[tlhe most important project now underway
in the entire field of constitutional the~ry."~
Ackerman tells us
that it has been his "principal preoccupation" during the
1980s.~Throughout those years he "steadfastly tried t o reserve
every morning for uninterrupted reading and writing? setting
out on a voyage "[tlo discover the Constitution"'-theretofore
presumably terra incognita? The mountain labored and
brought forth, according to Levinson: "a complex process of
'publian politics' where 'We the People' became authorized to
change the Constitution without even invoking the procedures
*

Quoted in DANIELJ. BOORSTIN,THE DISCOVERERS
367 (1983).
1. BRUCEACKERMAN,
WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS
(1991).
2.
Sanford Levinson, Dust Jacket to id.
3.
ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, at ix.
4.
Id.
5. I d . a t 3 .
6.
Terrance Sandalow regards it as "unfortunate" that Ackerman's rhetoric is
"inflated, self-important, and self-congratulatory." Terrance Sandalow, Abstract Democracy A Review of Acbrman's We the People, 9 C o ~ s r .COMMENTARY
309, 309
(1992).
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laid out in Article V."? To nullify Article V calls for more than
the lucubrations of a closet phil~sopher.~
Ackerman's "discovery" masks the fact that the Court, not the people, changed the
Constitution: and thus it merely rationalizes judicial revisionism. At no time, wrote Leonard Levy, "have the American people passed judgment, pro or con, on the merits of judicial review over Congress [let alone judicial alteration of the Consti-

7.
Levinson, supra note 2. Hobbes wrote, "The authority of writers, without
the authority of the commonwealth, maketh not their opinions law." THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN146 (1943). Judge Easterbrook observes that behind
Ackerman's argument "is the belief that Something Big happened in 1933-53: an
unwritten amendment to the Constitution incorporating the New Deal and authorizing a great enlargement of federal power. I confess to doubting the equivalence
of written and unwritten amendments to the Constitution . . . . If the document
no longer binds us in some respects, why does it govern in others?" Frank H.
Easterbrook, k v e l s of Generality in Constitutional Interpretation: Abstraction and
Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 368 (1992).
Suzanna Sherry states of Ackerman's theory (that the people revised Article V)
that his "historical evidence completely fails to demonstrate this." S u z a ~ aSherry,
The Ghost of Liberalism Past, 105 HARv. L. REV. 918, 928 (1992) (book review).
She criticizes his "exclusion of the massive historical evidence from the Philadelphia Convention, the ratlfymg conventions," etc., and states that his "decision to
ignore it makes for poor history indeed." Id. a t 924.
Sandalow justly finds it "doubtful that the People made, or can be shown to
8.
have made, the decisions he attributes to them." Sandalow, supra note 6, a t 329.
Under Ackerman's theory, says Sandalow, "responsibility for determining the shape
and direction of constitutional law does not rest with the People . . . but with the
Justices." Id. at 331. Ackerman's "contention that the Court is merely pursuing a
course set by the People seems implausible." Id. "[Iln Ackerman's 'dualist democracy' it is the Justices, not the People, who make the crucial constitutional decisions." Id. at 335. In short, the Court "has emerged as a major policymaking institution, exercising power that the framers would not have recognized as being 'of a
Judiciary Nature.' " Id. a t 3 10 (citation omitted).
Such judicial revisionism "cannot be accounted for by the mechanisms of
9.
change provided by the Constitutionn-i.e., the amendment process of Article V. Id.
a t 310. To do Sandalow justice, he considers that these departures "are now so
deeply embedded in our 'working constitution' that it may seem quixotic to raise
questions about their legitimacy." Id. at 312. By such reasoning, larceny may be
legitimated if repeated often enough.
But in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 36 (1892), the Court rejected the
notion that the Constitution may be "amended by judicial decision without action
by the designated organs in the mode by which alone amendments can be made."
And in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938), the Court speaking by Justice Brandeis, who quoted Justice Holmes, branded SwiR v. Tyson, 4 1 U.S. (16
Pet.) 1 (1842), " 'an unconstitutional assumption of powers by courts of the United
States which no lapse of time or respectable array of opinion should make us hesitate to correct."
Finally, both Sandalow and Ackerman "emphasize that the absence of a satisfactory theory-one that recognizes and justifies the realities of constitutional
a corrosive effect on the commitment to
change [by the Court]--has
constitutionalism." Sandalow, supra note 6, at 312.
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tution]. Consent freely given, by referendum, by legislation, or
by amendment is simply not the same a s failure to abolish or
impair."1° There is no provision for amendment by inertia.
Activist justifications of the Court's "exercise of the amending power"" are nothing new.12 What is new is Ackerman's
argument that this was done at the behest of the people.13 Nowhere, of course, has the Court intimated that it was carrying
out the mandate of the people in spite of the Constitution.14
Hamilton cautioned that "[ulntil the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act, annulled or changed the established
form, it is binding upon themselves . . . and no presumption, or
even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act."15 But
times have changed. The late Robert Cover of Yale thrust aside
"the self-evident meaning of the Constitution" because "we"
have decided to "entrust" judges [where?] with framing a n
"ideology" whereby legislation may be measured,16 and, it may
Leonard W. Levy, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An Introduction,
10.
REVIEWAND THE SCJPREME
COURT1, 31 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 1967).
in JUDICIAL
11. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
12.
There is a sea of "defenses" of judicial revisionism. For citations, see Raoul
Berger, New Theories of "Interpretation": The. Activist Flight from the Constitution,
47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 2 n.8 (1986). For example, Levy declared that the "Court is
and must be for all practical purposes a 'continuous constitutional convention' in
the sense that it must keep updating the original charter by reinterpretation."
LEONARD
W. LEVY,AGAINSTTHE LAW 23, 29-30 (1974). Justice Black, however,
derided "rhapsodical strains about the duty of this Court to keep the Constitution
in tune with the times. The idea is that the Constitution must be changed from
time to time and that this Court is charged with a duty to make those changes . . . . The Constitution makers knew the need for change and provided for it"
by the amendment process of Article V. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.479, 522
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
13.
In a penetrating review of Ackerman's opus, Stephen Presser notes
Ackerman's claims that "[c]onstitutional change flows from the people and not the
court, even when the change is accomplished by such decisions as Brown, Miranda
and Roe" and that the Warren and Burger courts were working out the details of
a change in rights that essentially had been ordered by the people themselves."
Stephen Presser, Locking in Liberalism, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1991, $ 14, a t 5. For
another adverse review, see Sherry, supra note 7.
14.
To the contrary, in a letter to President Roosevelt, Professor Fraddbrter
indicated that the Court repeatedly told the people that when it spoke, "it is not
they who speak but the Constitution." Letter from Felix F r a n f i r t e r to Franklin
Roosevelt (Feb. 18, 1937), in ROOSEVELTAND F R A N ~ R T ETHEIR
R : CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, a t 383 (Max Freedman ed., 1967).
15.
THE FEDERALIST
NO. 78, a t 509 (Alexander Hamilton) (Modern Library
1937).
16.
Robert M. Cover, Book Review, NEW REPUBLIC,Jan. 14, 1978, at 26, 27
(reviewing RAOULBERGER, GOVERNMENT
BY JUDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION
OF
THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
(1977)). Ackerman puts it more delicately: the New
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be added, the Framers' choices jettisoned.
Ackerman attributes this momentous change to the people
themselves. Consider Brown u. Board of ducati ion," which
worked a revolution-the overthrow of segregation. "[Olnly a
mobilized mass movement," writes Ackerman, "might encourage progressive Democrats and Republicans to overcome massive Southern resistance to new civil rights legislation. At the
time Brown was argued and reargued . . . such a mass movement did not exist."18 In other words, Brown "did not come a t
[a] moment[] when a mobilized citizenry was demanding a fundamental change in our fundamental law."19 The "real significance" of Brown et al., Ackerman opines, "lie[s] elsewhere, in
the Court's courage in confronting modern Americans with a
moral and political agenda that calls upon them to heed the
voices of their better selves."2oBrown therefore presented the
people with a virtually irreversible fait accompli rather than a
response to popular demand. I t came to achieve "retroactive

Deal "began to build new constitutional foundations for activist national government." ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, a t 49. "The Constitution . . . is an evolving historical practice, constituted by generations of Americans as they mobilized." Id. a t
34. On the other hand, Justice Story, a fervent nationalist, wrote that the Constitution "is to have a fixed, uniform, permanent construction[,] . . . not dependent
upon the passions or parties of particular times, but the same yesterday, [today], .
and [forever]." JOSEPH
STORY,COMMENTARIES
ON THE CONSTIT~JTION
OF THE UNITED STATES$ 426, at 410 (1st ed. 1833).
17.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
supra note 1, a t 135. Benjamin Hooks, Executive Director of the
ACKERMAN,
18.
NAACP said, " 'I don't think America was ready to end segregation[;] I don't think
it has ever been ready to extend full equality.' " Peter Applebome, Rights Movement in Struggle for an Image as Well as a Bill, N.Y.TIMES,April 3, 1991, a t Al.
19.
ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, a t 133.
20.
Id. Sidney Hook decried those "who know what the basic human needs. . .
should be, who know not only what these needs are but what they require better
than those who have them or should have them." SIDNEYHOOK,PHILOSOPHY
AND
RJRLIC
POLICY
28 (1980). "It is arrogant," he adds, to assume that "some self-selected elite can better determine what the best interests of other citizens are than
those citizens themselves." Id. at 29. Lord Aman, then Vice-chancellor of the University of London, rejected the theory that governments
can identify what people would realty want were they enlightened . . .
and understood fully what was needed to promote a good, just and satisfying society. For if it is true that this can be identified then surely the
state is justified in ignoring what ordinary people say they desire or
detest.
TO ISAIAH
BERLIN,PERSONAL IMPRESSIONS
at xiii, xvii
NOELANNAN,INTRODUCTION
(1981). Compare Justice Brennan's insistence that death penalties are contrary to
"human dignity" despite his recognition that the people remain attached to them.
Raoul Berger, Justice Brennan us. the Constitution, 29 B.C. L. REV. 787, 796-98
(1988).
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canonization," Ackerman states, by virtue of the "Civil Rights
Acts of 1964 and 1968 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.'"'
But these acts premised that Brown was rooted in the Constitution, whereas Ackerman himself recognizes that Brown's
constitutional authority is dubi~us.~%ence he is driven to
assert that Brown possesses "the kind of numinous legal authority that is . . . uniquely associated with legal documents
that express the considered judgments of We the Pe~ple."'~
The people, however, justifiably assumed that when the Court
outlawed segregation its decision was mandated by the Constitution rather than by Warren's personal predilection^.'^ Subsequent legislation could not legitimate the Court's disregard of
Article V's provisions for amendment of the Constitution. Neither the ringing admonitions of Washington,z5 Hamilt~n,'~

21.
ACKERMAN, supra note 1, a t 137.
22.
Ackerman notes that Herbert Wechsler, a "leading legal scholar," "could not
find a principled way to just@ Brown." Id. a t 144. "[Elven Brown's defenders had
to move far beyond Warren's feeble effort to justify the ways of the Court to
thoughtful lawyers." Id. For a collection of the historical data which demonstrate
that the Framers excluded segregation from the ambit of the Fourteenth AmendTHE TRANSFORMATION
OF
ment, see RAOULBERGER,GOVERNMENTBY JZJDICIARY:
THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 117-33 (1977). Michael Perry listed examples of
"commentary generally accepting Berger's history" and some "generally effective
rebuttals by Berger to criticisms of his history." Michael J. Perry, Interpretivism,
Freedom of Expression, and Equal Protection, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 261, 285 n.100
(1981). Perry concluded that the Framers did not intend to prohibit segregated
schooling or to enjoin laws establishing racial segregation. MICHAELJ. PERRY,THE
THE COURTSAND HUMAN
RIGHTS91-92 (1982).
CONSTITUTION,
For citations accepting my historical findings, see Raoul Berger, Lawyering us.
Philosophizing: Facts or Fancies, 9 U. DAYTONL. REV. 171, 174 n.25 (1984). Although Sanford Levinson approves of the Brown result, he acknowledges that i t
"cannot plausibly be thought to derive in its entirety from the unamended Constitution itself, and judicial supremacy in the absence of such derivation does continue to exhibit overtones of Platonic guardianship." Sanford Levinson, T h Turn Toward Functionalism in Constitutional Theory, 8 U. DAYTONL. REV. 567, 578
(1983). Mark Tushnet observed that the legislative history "leads one to conclude
that school segregation is not unconstitutional," that were we to ask the Framers
"whether the amendment outlawed segregation in public schools, they would answer 'No.' " Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules h i d Down: A Critique of
Interpretiuism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781, 800 (1983); see also
LEARNED
HAND,THE BILL OF RIGHTS55 (1958).
23.
ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, at 137. Racism remains "the still crippling disease
of American life." ARTHURM. SCHLESINGER,
JR., THE DISUNITINGOF AMERICA14
(1992). Tom Wicker, liberal columnist, observed, "[Tlhe attitudes between the races,
the fear and animosity that exist today, are greater than, let us say, a t the time
of the Brown case, the famous school desegregation decision in 1954." Opinions
Considered: A Talk with Tom Wicker, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 5, 1992, 8 4, at 4.
24.
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
25.
In his Farewell Address, Washington warned the people to correct the Con-
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and Madison2? to honor the process for change Article V lays
down, nor the Supreme Court's "[ilt is not the function of courts
or legislative bodies . . . to alter the method [for change] which
the Constitution has fixed,"28 count for anything with
A~kerman.~'On the other hand, Justice Harlan declared,
'When the Court disregards the express intent and understanding of the Framers, it has invaded the realm of the political
process to which the amending power was committed, and it
has violated the constitutional structure which is its highest
duty to protect."30
Despite his emphasis on the need "to discover meaning in
our constitutional history,"31 when it comes to specifics
Ackerman turns his back on constitutional history.32 This is
abundantly apparent from his treatment of "privileges or immunities" and the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. My
purposes are to vindicate contested truth and demonstrate that
any indictment concerning a lack of "basic reliability" is to be
laid a t his door, not mine. In weighing a work heralded as the
"most important project now underway in the field of constitutional theory," "basic reliability" is of the essence.
My Government by Judiciary (1977):~ which marshalled
the evidence against judicial transformation of the Fourteenth
'

stitution "by an amendment in the way which the Constitution designates. But let
there be no change by usurpation for . . . it is the customary weapon by which
free governments are destroyed." George Washington, Farewell Address, in 35 THE
WRITINGSOF GEORGE
WASHINGTON
229 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1940).
See supra text accompanying note 15.
26.
27.
In the First Congress, Madison said, "sovereignty of the people" means "the
people can change the Constitution if they please; but while the Constitution exists, they must conform themselves to its dictates." 1 ANNALSOF CONG.739 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789) (running head "History of Congress").
28.
Hawke v. Smith, 253 U S . 221, 227 (1920); see also supra note 16. Chief
Justice Marshall stated that if the Constitution is not "unchangeable by ordinary
means . . . then written constitutions are absurd attempts on the part of the people, to limit a power, in its own nature illimitable." Marbury v. Madison, 5 US. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
But see STORY, supra note 16; PHILIP B. KURLAND,
WATERGATE
AND THE
29.
CONSTITZJTION
7 (1978); South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448-49
(1905).
30.
Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 203 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
31.
supra note 1, at 36. "History for the activist is a protean inACKERMAN,
strument, useful for legitimating a predetermined result." LEONARD
W. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYSIN AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY78 (1972).
See infi-a note 76.
32.
33.
RY JLJDICIARY:
THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE
RAOULBERGER,GOVERNMENT
FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
(1977).
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Amendment, prompted Ackerman a t this late date to attack my
"bad history,"34expatiating at length:
By '%ad," I mean really bad. One example should be enough
to encourage you to treat Berger's use of sources with extreme
caution. Given Berger's premises, Justice Washington's famous opinion in Cofield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823) (No.3230) is a matter of great importance. As
Berger recognizes, Washington's definition of "privileges and
immunities" was quoted repeatedly by partisans to define the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. I t is therefore understandable that Berger wishes to establish that Washington's
opinion is consistent with his own view of the amendment a s
a superstatute, constitutionalizing only a fixed list of rights
previously enacted in the Civil Rights Act. Unfortunately,
Berger achieves this end by selective quotation and
italicization so egregious that it shakes confidence in his basic
reliability. . . . Berger conceals from the reader by the simple
expedient of replacing Washington's words with ellipses . . . .
. . . I am concerned with Berger's basic ethics a s a n historian . . . .
I am also troubled by Berger's use of italics to suggest
that Washington is emphasizing the limited character of his
construction of "privileges and immunities"-when in the
excised portion of the text he explicitly endorses a more expansive interpretation. This kind of shoddy work on a source
as crucial as Corfield is inexcusable.
[Elven by the standards of lawyers' history, [Berger's
Government by Judiciary] seems exceptionally tendentious in
its treatment of the sources.35

So my use of italics, and of ellipses t o avoid overlong quotations, becomes a t Ackerman's hands something sinister, "inex-

34.
ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, at 91. In 1983 Richard Saphire wrote,
"[Rlesponding to Berger's thesis has become somewhat of a cottage industry in
constitutional scholarship."Richard B. Saphire, Judicial Review in the Name of the
L. REV. 745, 753 (1983). "The magnitude and furor of
Constitution, 8 U . DAYTON
the scholarly response to &vernment by Judiciary reveals that Mr. Berger has
touched sensitive academic nerves." Wallace Mendelson, Ruoul Berger on the Four205, 211 (1987). To borrow from
teenth Amendment Corno Copia, 3 BENCHMARK
Eric Foner in another context, my thesis "remains important precisely because a
generation of scholars has directed its energies to overturning it." Eric Foner, The
Slaveholder as Factory Owner, N.Y.TIMESBOOKREVIEW,May 23, 1982, at 11, 27.
supra note 1, at 334-36 n.21. But cf. infra note 76. The eminent
35. ACKERMAN,
historiographer Peter Gay wrote that historical writing "seems tendentious to those
HISTORIANS
AT WORKat ix
who reject it." 1 PETERGAY & GERALDCAVANAUGH,
(1972).
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cusable." This charge of concealment is deflated by my quotation of the entire passage, without ellipsis, in The Fourteenth
Amendment and the Bill of Rights,S6thus countering an implication of sinister suppression. In any event, it is shoddy
scholarship to convert what might be regarded as a mere difference of opinion respecting an item of evidence into an "excision," a "concealment" designed to mislead the reader, betraying a lack of "basic ethics as an historian." This recalls a contemptible Communist tactic: it does not suffice to refute an
opponent,37he must be forever discredited.
Corfield v. Coryell is but one of thousands of facts detailed
in my book.38 It bears solely on "privileges and immunities,"
and it is but one fragment in a mosaic composed of many pieces
of evidence which prove its limited compass. What need was
there for me to misrepresent this one fragment when the rest
of the evidence sustains my conclusion as to the scope of "privileges and immunities"-evidence which Ackerman resolutely
disregards? Here are the facts.
*

I. "PRIVILEGES
AND IMMUNITIES"
The words "privileges and immunities" are first met in
Article IV of the Articles of Confederation: "the people of the

RAOLJL BERGER,THE FOU~TEENTH
AMENDMENT
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 34
36.
(1989). Ackerman's scholarly manners might be improved were he to ponder on
Lino Graglia's urbane mere mention of Judge Richard Posner's "lengthy quotation
from Bork's book which omits, without indication, a sentence that flatly contradicts
the charge." Lino A. Graglia, "Interpreting" the Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44
STAN.L. REV. 1019, 1038 (1992).
37.
"[Judge Richard] Posner agrees with [Robert] Bork that there is a . . .
6 Y
new class" . . . of left-liberal academics . . . predominant in American
Universities' "; and Professor Graglia places Ackerman in that class. Graglia, supm
note 36, a t 1049, 1022 (quoting Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN.
L. REV. 1365, 1381 (1990) (book review)). Paul Brest, a leading activist, pleaded
with his fellows "simply to acknowledge that most of our writings are not political
theory but advocacy scholarship designed to persuade the Court to adopt our various notions of the public good." Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controver'y:
The Essential Contradictions of Normative Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1109
(1981). My studies stand athwart such advocacy and therefore became the butt of
activist obloquy.
38.
THE FOUNDERS'
DESIGN(1987),
In a review of RAOULBERGER,FEDERALISM:
Michael M c C o ~ e l lnoted that Berger, by a "relentless collation" of quotations from
the Founders' utterances, demonstrates that "the framers and ratifiers of the Constitution intended the authority of the states to be far greater, and that of the
federal government far less, than it has turned out to be." Michael W. McConnell,
Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1484, 1485 (1987)
(emphasis added).
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different states . . . shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states," specifying "all the
privileges of trade and commerce."3g For the Founders, the
enumerated "privileges of trade and commerce" qualified the
general words "privileges and immunitie~.'"~The latter were
picked up by Article IV of the Constitution. Chief Justice White
stated that they were intended to perpetuate the "limitation of
the Articles of C~nfederation."~'White repeated Justice
Miller's statement in the Slaughter-House Cases that "[tlhere
can be but little question that . . . the privileges and immunities intended are the same in each."42From the beginning the
Maryland and Massachusetts courts construed Article IV in
terms of trade and commerce.43
The words "privileges and immunities" came into the Fourteenth Amendment by way of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866,
which referred to "civil rights or immunities.'"* In explaining
39.
art. IV (1777), reprinted in DOCUMENTS
OF
ARTICLESOF CONFEDERATION
AMERICANHISTORY111 (Henry S. Commager ed., 7th ed. 1963).
40.
In T k Federalist, Madison asked, "For what purpose could the enumeration
of particular powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be included
in the preceding general power?" THE FEDERALIST
No. 41, a t 269 (James Madison)
Modern Library 1937).
In the 39th Congress, Martin Thayer said of the Civil Rights Bill of 1866:
"[Wlhen those civil rights which are first referred to in general terms in the bill
are subsequently enumerated, that enumeration precludes any possibility that the
general words which have been used can be extended beyond the particulars which
AMENDMENTS'DEBATES169 (Alfred
have been enumerated." THE RECONSTRIJCTION
Avins ed., 1967) [hereinafter DEBATES].
41.
United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281, 294 (1920) (emphasis added).
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939), explains that Article IV "prevents a State
from discriminating against citizens of other States in favor of its own."
42.
254 U.S. a t 296 (quoting Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75
(1872)).
43.
Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 535, 554 (Md. 1797); Abbot v. Bayley, 23
Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 91 (1827). Daniel Webster emphasized that Article IV put i t
beyond the power of any state to hinder entry " 'for the purposes of trade, cornmerce, buying and selling.' " DEBATES,supra note 40, a t 466 (citation omitted). The
principal spokesmen and theorists of the abolitionist movement, Lysander Spooner
and Joel Tiffany, argued that "privileges and immunities" embraced "protection in
the enjoyment of [ a citizen's] personal security, personal liberty, and private property, . . . [and] protection against . . . lawless violence exercised under the forms
TENBROEK,EQUALUNDERLAW 110 (1965).
of governmental authority." JACOBUS
COMMENTARIES
ON THE
These were the Blackstonian triad, 1 WILLIAMBLACKSTONE,
LAWSOF ENGLAND129, 134, 138 (1765-1769), which James Wilson read to the
39th Congress as defining "civil rights." CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1118
(1866). He emphasized that the rights enumerated in the Civil Rights Bill of 1866
were no "greater than the rights which are included in the general term 'life, liberty and property.' " Id. a t 1295.
44.
CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 211 (1866).
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those words to the Senate, Senator Lyman Trumbull, chairman
of the Senate Judiciary Committee, not only read from Corfield
v. Coryell, but also from the cases from Maryland (per Samuel
Chase, soon to be elevated to the U.S. Supreme Court) and
M a s s a c h ~ s e t t s .Chase
~~
declared that the words were to be
given a "limited ~ p e r a t i o n . "It~ ~is a n index of Washington's
"expansive interpretation" i n Corfield-and
of t h a t
interpretation's "great abstraction and ~weep'"~-that he held
the words did not confer on an out-of-state citizen the privilege
of dredging for oysters in New Jersey waters! But Washington
experienced no difficulty in concluding that a sojourner would
have the right to vote. Disavowing this, Trumbull stated that
Washington "goes further than the bill under con~ideration.'"~
Certainly Trumbull did not read Corfield broadly; he stated
that it enumerates "the very rights that are set forth in [the
first section of the] bill," and he explained that "[tlhe great
fundamental rights set forth" in the bill are "the right to acquire property, the right to go and come a t pleasure, the right
to enforce rights in the courts, to make contracts, and to inherit
and dispose of property.'"g
Four years after Corfield, in 1827, Chief Justice Parker
declared on behalf of the Massachusetts court that the "privileges and immunities" clause confers a "right to sue and be
sued," that citizens who move to a second State "cannot enjoy
the right of suffrage [contradicting Washington]" but "may take

45.
DEBATES,supra note 40, a t 121-22.
3 H. & McH. at 554. Chase was 30 years closer to the Founders than Jus46.
tice Washington.
47.
ACKERMAN,supra note 1, at 335-36 n.21.
DEBATES,supra note 40, a t 122.
48.
Id. (emphasis added). Martin Thayer said, the "section goes on to define
49.
with greater particularity the civil rights and immunities which are to be protected
by the bill." Id. a t 169; see also Thayer's comments, supra note 40.
Speaking on behalf of four dissenters in the Slaughter-House Cases, Justice
Field said that Corfield was "cited by Senator Trumbull with the observation that
it enumerated the very rights . . . set forth in the first section of the a d , . . .
that these were the great fundamental rights set forth in the act." 83 U.S. (16
Wall.) 36, 98 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting). William Windom of Minnesota said that
the Civil Rights Bill affords blacks "an equal right, nothing more . . . to make and
enforce contracts [etc.] . . . . I t merely provides safeguards to shield them from
wrong and outrage, and to protect them in the enjoyment of . . . the right to exist." CONG. GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1159 (1866); see also the Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22, 24, 25 (1883). William Lawrence said in the 39th Congress
that the Bill provides "that as to certain enumerated civil rights" what "may be
enjoyed by any shall be shared by all citizens in each State." CONG. GLOBE,39th
Cong. 1st Sess. 1832 (1866).
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and hold real estate."50If Corfield be read broadly, it was patently without influence on the contemporary Massachusetts
court. Ackerman would attribute to an 1823 opinion the power
t o expand an 1866 enactment that its spokesman, after quoting
from Corfield, said enumerated the "very rights" mentioned in
the bill, something Georgia u. Rachel described as "a limited
category of rights.'"' Serious scholarship requires cognizance
of "discrepant" evidence.52No allusion to the foregoing facts
appears in the Ackerman indictment.
Turn now t o the particulars of Ackerman's diatribe, beginning with his objection to my "use of italics" in quoting from
Corfield: " 'We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions
to those privileges and immunities which are, in their nature,
fundamental . . . .' "53 Ackerman complains that this suggests
that 'Washington is emphasizing the limited character of his
construction of 'privileges and immunities'-when in the excised portion of the text he explicitly endorses a more expansive interpretati~n.'"~An author's italicization reflects his
judgment of what is significant. Minimally, the italicized "confined" conflicts with Washington's allegedly "expansive interpretation."
Consider the "excised portion." After enumerating the
rights of property, contracts-and the "elective franchise" rejected by Trumbull-Washington said,
These, and many others which might be mentioned
[Ackerman's italics], are, strictly speaking privileges and
immunities and the enjoyment of them by the citizens of each
state, in every other state, was manifestly calculated (to use
the expressions of the preamble of the corresponding provision in the old articles of confederation) "the better to secure
and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the

50.
Abbot v. Bayley, 23 Mass. (6 Pick.) 89, 92 (1827).
384 U.S. 780, 791 (1966). In a decision contemporary with the Amendment,
51.
the Court declared, "[Tlhe Amendment did not add to the privileges and immunities of a citizen." Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1874). In the
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883), Justice Bradley, a contemporary of the
Civil Rights Bill of 1866, declared that it undertook to secure "the same right t o
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, . . . and to inherit, purchase . . .
property as is enjoyed by white citizens. . . . Congress did not assume . . . to
adjust what may be called the social rights of men . . . ." See also infra note 98.
225 (1959).
GEORGEIU AND THE HISTORIANS
52.
HERBERTBUITERFIELD,
53.
BERGER,supra note 33, at 31 (quoting Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,
551 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 3230)).
ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, at 335-36 n.21.
54.
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people of the different states of the Union." But we cannot
accede to the proposition . . . that . . . the citizens of the several states are permitted to participate in all [emphasis not in
original] the rights which belong exclusively to the citizens of
any other particular state.55

Not only is there a n internal contradiction between "confined"
to "fundamental rights" and "many others," but rejection of
"all" local rights undermines an "expansive interpretation."
Then too, Washington's reference to the "corresponding" Article
IV of the Articles of Confederation, which was limited to "trade
and commerce," is a t war with the "expansive" content which
Ackerman espies. It was altogether reasonable to infer from
these facts that Corfield may not be read to expand the "fundamental rights" enumerated by T r u m b ~ l l . ~ ~
OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT
11. THE SCOPE

Let me turn to another major example of Ackerman's indifference to unpalatable facts. On Berger's view, he states,
the Fourteenth Amendment.. . had a very narrow aim: to
constitutionalize the rules contained in a single statute, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, that the Reconstruction Congress
had enacted into law a few months earlier. Unfortunately for
Berger, the text of the amendment does not even mention this
act; nor does it . . . affirmatively state, in relatively clear and
o p e r a t i o n a l t e r m s , t h e r u l e s t h a t i t wishes t o
constit~tionalize.~~

My "belief" that "the People enacted a superstatute [his jargon]
that changed the Constitution only in the precise ways enumerated in the Civil Rights Act of 1866,"~~
he dismisses as "false
55.
Id. a t 335 11.21 (quoting CorfWId, 6 F. Cas. a t 552) (Ackerman's brackets
omitted).
56.
Of Ackerman, one may say what Julius Goebel wrote of William Crosskey:
"Coming to his task with a new axe to grind [he] has seemingly forsworn all canons of objectivity to make himself a grindstone to suit his purposes." Julius Goebel,
Jr., Book Review, 54 COLUM.L. REV. 450, 451 (1954). Robert Jastrow observed
that "when our beliefs are in conflict with the evidence," "[wle become irritated."
Robert Jastrow, Have the Astronomers Found God?, N.Y. TIMES,
June 25, 1978, $ 6
(Magazine) a t 18, 19. Richard Kay wrote that the desegregation and reapportionment decisions "have now become almost second nature to a generation of lawyers
and scholars. Thus, it is hardly surprising that the casting of a fundamental doubt
on such basic assumptions should produce shock, dismay, and sometimes anger."
Richard S. Kay, Book Review, 10 CONN.L. REV. 801 (1978).
57.
ACKERMAN, supra note 1, a t 91.
Id. a t 92. Ackerman charges that I have "trivialized Time Two [the Recon58.
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to the historical character of Republican Reconstructi~n."~~
Ackerman ignores what Chief Justice Marshall called "the
most sacred rule of interpretation," resort to the "intention."'
Summarizing the common law in 1736, Matthew Bacon stated,
"Everything which is within the Intention of the Makers of a
Statute is, although it be not within the Letter thereof, as
much within the statute as that which is within the Letter?
The Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment made clear that we
were to be guided by their intention.
Senator Charles Sumner, arch-protagonist of all-out
antidiscrimination, said that if the meaning of the Constitution
"in any place is open to doubt, or if words are used which seem
to have no fixed signification [e.g., equal protection], we cannot
err if we turn to the framers."62His view was shared by confreres in the 39th Congress. In 1871, John Farnsworth said of
the Amendment, "Let us see what was understood to be its
meaning at the time of its adoption by Congress . . . ."63
James Garfield, later the martyred president, rejected an interpretation that went "far beyond the intent and meaning of
those who framed and those who amended the Con~titution."~~
These sentiments found powerfiil confirmation in 1872 by a
unanimous Senate Judiciary Committee Report, signed by
Senators who had voted for the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments:
In construing the Constitution we are compelled to give it

struction era] by characterizing its constitutional amendments as superstatutes." Id.
a t 91. The characterization is his, not mine. I am comfortable with the existing
scholarly vocabulary.
Id. at 92.
59.
JOHN
MARSHALL'SDEFENSEOF McCulloch v. Maryland 167 (Gerald Gunther
60.
ed., 1969). Ackerman is willing to use "intent of the Framers" so long as it is
confined to the "intentions of the People," not the "small number of 'Framers' who
supra note 1, at 88 & footnote. As I will
proposed the Constitution." ACKERMAN,
demonstrate, the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated that their
debates would be consulted.
61.
4 MATTHEW
BACON,A NEW ABMDGMENT OF THE b w 647-48 (3d ed. 1768);
see also Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 212 (1903). When a legislature "has
intimated its will, however indirectly," Justice Holmes said, "that will should be
recognized and obeyed . . . . [Ilt is not an adequate discharge of duty for courts to
say: We see what you are driving at, but you have not said it . . . ." Johnson v.
United States, 163 F. 30, 32 (1st Cir. 1908).
62.
CONG.GLORE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 677 (1866).
63.
DEBATES,supra note 40, at 506. For additional citations, see BERGER,supra
note 36, a t 137-38.
64.
supra note 40, a t 528.
DERATES,
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such interpretation as will secure the result which was intended to be accomplished by those who framed it and the
people who adopted it. . .
. . . A construction which should give the phrase . . . a
meaning differing from the sense in which it was understood
and employed by the people when they adopted the Constitution, would be as unconstitutional as a departure from the
plain and express language of the Constitution . . . . This is
the rule of interpretation adopted by all commentators on the
Constitution, and in all judicial expositions of that instrument

.

. . . .65

Now for some uncontroverted proof that the framers
deemed the Bill and section one of the Fourteenth Amendment
t o be identical. George Latharn stated that "the 'civil rights
bill,' which is now a law, . . . covers exactly the same ground as
this a~nendment."~Martin Thayer said, "[Ilt is but incorporating in the Constitution of the United States the principle of
the civil rights bill which has lately become a law . . . .n67 An
early activist, Howard Jay Graham, wrote that "[vlirtually
every speaker in the debates on the Fourteenth Amendments
[sic]-Republicans and Democrats alike-said or agreed that
the Amendment was designed to embody or incorporate the
Civil Rights Act."6s Horace Flack, a broad constructionist of
the Amendment wrote, "[Nlearly all said that it was but an
incorporation of the Civil Rights Bill . . . . [Tlhere was no controversy or misunderstanding as t o its purpose and meaning."' More recently Charles Fairman wrote, "Over and over
in this debate [on the Amendment] the correspondence between
Section I of the Amendment and the Civil Rights Act is noted.
The provisions of the one are treated as though they were essentially identical with those of the other."70 And Justice
Bradley, a contemporary of the Amendment, declared that "the
fxst section of the bill covers the same ground as the fourteenth a~nendment."~'

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id. at 571.

CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2883 (1866).
supra note 40, at 213.
DEBATES,
J. GRAHAM,EVERYMAN'S
CONSTITUTION
291 11.73 (1968).
HOWARD
FLACK,THE ADOPTION
OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT81 (1908).
HORACE
Charles Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of
70.
Rights? The Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV.5, 44 (1949).
71.
Live-stock Dealers' & Butchers' Ass'n v. Crescent City Live-stock Landing &
Slaughter-House Co., 15 F. Cas. 649, 655 (C.C.D. La. 1870) (No. 8408).
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On the ratification trail in August 1866, Senator Trumbull
"clearly and unhesitatingly declared [section one of the Amendment] to be 'a reiteration of the rights as set forth in the Civil
Rights Bill.' "" Indiana Senator Lane "affirmed Trumbulrs
statement concerning the first section," and Senator Sherman
of Ohio endorsed those views in a speech on September 29,
1 8 6 6 . ~Senator
~
Poland of Maine spoke to the same effect i n
November 1 8 6 6 . ~In
~ sum, Joseph James concluded, "statements of congressmen before their constituents definitely identify the provisions of the first section of the amendment with
those of the Civil Rights ill."^^ Ackerman's neglect to comment on this history,76 spread before him in my writings,
speaks volumes.
"For correctives" to my "exceptionally tendentious . . .
treatment of the sources" he cites Jacobus tenBroek, William
Nelson, and Michael cur ti^,'^ without noting my painstaking
critiques of t e n B r ~ e kand
~ ~ Nelson,7g or Forrest McDonald's
judgment that my refutation of Curtis is "utterly devastating."80 So too, he ignores Henry Monaghan's statement that
"Berger's uncomfortable and unfashionable analysis is an important one. It will not do, as some have already done, to brush
it aside in a peremptory manner."81 Sanford Levinson wrote,
"[Ilt is naive to pretend that . . . we can so easily shed the view
72.
JOSEPH
B. JAMES,
THE FRAMINGOF THE FOURTEENTHAMENDMENT 161
(1965) (citation omitted).
Id. a t 162, 164.
73.
74.
AMENDMICHAELK. CURTIS,NO STATESHALLABRIDGETHE FOURTEENTH
MENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS252 n.46 (1986).
75.
JAMES,supra note 72, at 179.
76.
Sherry states that "Ackerman tends to ignore the historical context." Sherry, supra note 7, a t 926. She also criticizes his "exclusion of the massive historical
evidence from the Philadelphia Convention, the ratifying conventions," etc. His
"decision to ignore i t makes for poor history indeed. What he produces is not even
'law office history,' because it ignores a tremendous amount of both favorable and
unfavorable evidence and thus can hardly be considered history at all." Id. a t 92425. Compare this with Ackerman's charge that I am guilty of "bad history." See
supra text accompanying note 31.
77.
supra note 1, a t 336 11.21.
ACKERMAN,
78.
BERGER,supm note 33, at 177-83, 188-90; see also id. at 473 (index reference to "tenBroekn).
79.
Raoul Berger, Fantasizing About the Fourteenth Amendment: A Review Essay, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1043 (reviewing WILLIAM E. NELSON,THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT:FROMP O L ~ I C APRINCIPLE
L
TO JUDICLAL
DOCTRINE
(1988)).
80.
Forrest McDonald, How the Fourteenth Amendment Repealed the ConstituOct. 1989, a t 29, 31.
tion, CHRONICLES,
81.
Henry P. Monaghan, The Constitution Goes to Haruard, 13 C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 117, 124 (1978).
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of the Constitution, and its limits, articulated by Berger.""
My Government by Judiciary won praise from Willard
and C. Vann
H ~ r s t Philip
, ~ ~ K ~ r l a n d Forrest
,~~
Woodward:'
scholars of higher stature than Curtis and Nelson?? What sort of scholarship is it that prefers the testimony
of a tyro like Curtis to that of renowned scholars?88
Ackerman charges that I have "trivialized [the Reconstruction era] by characterizing its constitutional amendments as
super statute^.'"^ "Superstatutes" is his characterization, not
mine. Let me set forth still other historical facts that demonstrate the framers' narrow aim. Late in the discussion of the
Amendment, Senator James Patterson, who voted for it, declared, "[I] am opposed to any law discriminating against
[blacks] i n the security and protection of life, liberty, person,
property, and the proceeds of their labor . . . . Beyond this I am
not prepared to go."g0 Such remarks arose from the "commitment to traditional state-federal relation^,"^^ so that Alfred
82.
Sanford Levinson, Wrong But Lqal?, 236 NATION248, 250 (Feb. 26, 1983)
(book review).
83.
"This is a major piece of work, and a very illuminating one." Willard Hurst,
Dust Jacket to BERGER,supra note 33.
84.
Philip Kurland wrote that Government by Judiciary "reflects a deep scholarship . . . and an ardent plea for intellectual honesty." Phillip B. Kurland, Foreword
to RAOIJLBERGER,SELECTED
WRITINGSON CONSTITIJTIONAL
LAWa t i, vi (1987).
85.
Forrest McDonald regards Government by Judiciary as "indispensable," "definitive," "prodigious research," and comments that my "work was herculean, brilliant, and irrehtable." McDonald, supra note 80, a t 29-31.
86.
"Raoul Berger's Government by Judiciary raises scores of fascinating questions that no one in the field can afford to ignore." C. V ~ MWoodward, Dust Jacket to BERGER, supra note 33. Jacobus tenBroek, an early neo-abolitionist, wrote
that the principal spokesmen and theorists of the abolitionist movement, Lysander
Spooner and Joel Tiffany, regarded "privileges and immunities" as a right to "hll
and ample protection in the enjoyment of [the blacks'] personal security, personal
liberty, and private property, . . . protection against . . . oppression . . . [and]
against lawless violence." TENBROEK,supra note 43, a t 110. Those like William
Nelson, who invoke abolitionist theorizing for reading their social aspirations into
the Fourteenth Amendment, go beyond their leading spokesmen. See Berger, supra
note 79.
87.
Such neophytes are transformed by the activists into "authorities" on the
adage "any stick to beat a dog."
88.
Writing to Justice Holmes, Harold Laski considered it a just criticism that
a writer "has no sense of the proportionate value of his authorities." Letter from
Harold J . Laski to Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes (Jan. 6, 1934), in 2 HOLMES1463 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953). Philip Kurland wrote, "Berger's
LASKI L ~ E W
touchstone has been the text of the Constitution in light of the history of its origins. It is this stance that has made him anathema to so many of our sitting
professors of constitutional law and political science." Kurland, supra note 84, at i.
89.
ACKERMAN,
supra note 1, at 91.
90.
CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2699 (1866).
91.
Alfred H. Kelly, Comment on Harold M. Hyman's Paper, in NEW FRONTIERS
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Kelly-who helped the NAACP prepare the desegregation
case-stated, "the radical Negro reform program could be only
a very limited one."92Justice Harlan justly described as "irrefutable and still unanswered"93 the evidence that suffrage, the
quintessential right, was excluded from the ambit of the
amendment.94 Time and again proposals to bar all forms of
discrimination were reje~ted.'~
Then there is a remarkable incident on which no activist,
Ackerman included, has seen fit to comment. John Bingham,
draftsman of the Amendment, vehemently objected to the "oppressive" words "civil rights" in the Civil Rights Bill because
they would reach racial discrimination "in any of the civil
rights of the citizen," and would "reform the whole civil and

O F THE AMERICAN
RECONSTRUCTION
55 (Harold M. Hyman ed., 1966). Hyman noted
Republican "unwillingness to travel . . . any road more rugged than the Civil
Rights-Freedmen's Bureau extension-Fourteenth Amendment route that left the
states masters of their fates." HAROLDM. HYMAN,A MORE PERFECTUNION470
(1973). Philip Paludan repeatedly emphasized that attachment to federalism-State
control of local institutions-was "the most potent institutional obstacle to the
Negroes' hope for protected liberty." PHILIP S. PALIJDAN,A COVENANT
WITH DEATH
15, 31, 51, 54 (1975). Justice Brandeis declared that the Constitution "preserves
the autonomy and independence of the States." Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938). For additional citations, see BERGER,supra note 33, a t 50-51.
92.
Kelly, supra note 91, a t 55 (emphasis added).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring in
93.
the judgment).
Senator Sumner regarded suffrage as "the only sufficient guarantee," with94.
out which the Fourteenth Amendment was inadequate to protect the blacks in
anything. CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 685 (1866); see also CONG.GLOBE,
40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1008 (1869). Justices Stone, Brandeis, and Cardozo, dissenting
in Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404, 443 (1935), rested on solid ground when they
stated that the Fourteenth Amendment "created no new privileges and immunities
of United States citizenship."
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that if suffrage is denied on
acmunt of race, the State's representation in the House of Representatives shall be
proportionately reduced. Senator Fessenden, Chairman of the Joint Committee on
Reconstruction, explained that the Amendment "leaves the power where it is; but
tells them [the States] most distinctly, if you exercise that power wronghlly, such
and such consequences will follow." DEBATES,supra note 40, a t 143. Senator
Howard observed, "[Tlhe States retain the power . . . of regulating the right of suffrage in the States. . . . [Tlhe theory of this whole amendment is, to leave the
power of regulating the suffrage with the people or Legislatures of the States, and
not to assume to regulate it . . . ." Id. at 237. John Bingham stated, "The amendment does not give, as the second section shows, the power to Congress of regulating suffrage in the several States." Id. at 217. The Joint Committee commended
Section 2 because it "would leave the whole question with the people of each
State." Id. a t 94.
95.
BERGER,supra note 33, a t 163-64.
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criminal code of every State g~vernment."~~
His expostulation
led t o the deletion of "civil rights or immunities." James Wilson, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, explained
that this deletion was accomplished in order to afford no
ground "for a latitudinarian construction not intended," and to
bar any construction going "beyond the specific rights named in
the se~tion."~'Why, I call upon Ackerman to explain, did
Bingham, after vigorously protesting against the "oppressive"
scope of "civd rights" in the Bill, switch to that very breadth in
the "privileges or immunities" of the Amendment? It is more
reasonable to conclude that "privileges and immunities" had
become words of art having limited meaning.ggOn this score,
lastly, the two leaders, Thaddeus Stevens and Senator
Fessenden, confessed that the Amendment had fallen short of
their hopes. Stevens settled for less notwithstanding his hope
that the people "would have so remodeled all our institutions
as t o have freed them from every vestige of. . . inequality of
rights . . . . that no distinction would be tolerated . . . . This
bright dream has vanished. . . . [W]e shall be obliged t o be
content with patching up the worst portions of the ancient
edifice . . . .""
Fessenden also recognized that "we cannot put into the
Constitution, owing t o existing prejudices and existing institu-

96.
DEBATES,supra note 40, a t 186, 188 (emphasis added).
Id. a t 191. Alexander Bickel considered that the B i n g h a f l i l s o n deletion
97.
"conclusively validated" the view that "the [Civil Rights] Bill dealt only with a
distinct and limited set of rights." Aviam Soifer, Protecting Civil Rights: A Critique
of Raoul Berger's History, 54 N.Y.U.L. REV 651, 685 n.165 (1979); see also Raoul
Berger, Soifer to the Rescue of History, 32 S.C. L. REV. 427 (1981).
After reading the judicial constructions t o the Senate, Trumbull noted, "this
98.
being the construdion as settled by judicial decisions." DEBATES,supra note 40, a t
122. And William Lawrence "concede[d] that the courts have by construction limited the words fall privileges' to mean only 'some privileges.' " Id. a t 207. In a similar context the Supreme Court said, "[Wle should not assume that Congress . . .
used the words . . . in their ordinary dictionary meanings when they had already
been construed as terms of art carrying a special and limited connotation." Yates
v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319 (1957) (emphasis added); see also United
States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55, 159 (C.C.D. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693) (Marshall, C.J.).
Bingham himself concurred in a limited meaning. On January 30, 1871, he
submitted a Report of the House Judiciary Committee reciting that the privileges
or immunities of the Fourteenth Amendment refer to none "other than those privileges and immunities embraced in the original text of the Constitution, article 4,
section 2. The fourteenth amendment . . . did not add to the privileges or immunities before mentioned . . . ." DEBATES,supra note 40, at 466; see also supra note
5 1.
DEBATES,supra note 40, a t 237.
99.
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tions [racism and states' rights], an entire exclusion of all class
distinction^."'^^ Ackerman's total disregard of the facts herein
detailed is far more incompatible with scholarly integrity than
my italicization and use of ellipses.
This does not exhaust Ackerman's disregard of historical
facts, his straining after "fancy theor[ies]" which confessedly
have no appeal t o "lawyer or judge,"lO' and which pepper his
pages. To compare them with the facts would be t o pad this
article with cumulative evidence that would weary the reader.
Instead I have followed his example: "One example should be
enough to encourage you to treat Berger's use of sources with
extreme caution."'02 He seized on a solitary evidentiary detail
for a reading that is countered by all of the other facts. I have
rebutted his sweeping allegations by marshalling incontrovertible evidence on two central issues: (1) the scope of "privileges
and immunities" and (2) the identity of the Civil Rights Act
and the Fourteenth Amendment.
Why do I dwell on the importance of constitutional history?
Justice Horace Gray, himself no mean historian, considered
that "all questions of constitutional construction" were "largely
. . . historical question[^]."'^^ That follows from considerations
of enduring importance. Ours is a government founded on the
consent of the governed. 'The people," declared James Iredell,
one of the ablest of the Founders, "have chosen to be governed
under such and such principles. They have not chosen to be
governed, or promised to submit, upon any other. . . ."'* Any
light upon the scope of their consent, what they sought to accomplish, is therefore of utmost importance. Gripped by fear of
the greedy expansiveness of power, the Framers steered by a
basic principle t o crib and confine all delegated power.'05
100. CONG.GLOBE,39th Cong., 1st Sess. 705 (1866).
supra note 1, at 17.
101. ACKERMAN,
102. Id. at 334 n.21.
103. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 169 (1895) (Gray, J., dissenting). After
commenting on Gray's dissent, Mark DeWolfe Howe observed, "There can be no
question but that he made important contributions to knowledge of the legal past
OWER WENDELL
in a number of his judicial opinions." 2 MARK D. HOWE,JUSTICE
HOLMES:THE PROVINGYEARS1870-1882, a t 116 (1963). Gray "was quite properly
conceived to be a legal historian of exceptional competence." Id.
104. 2 GEORGEJ. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF JAMES
IREDELL 146
(1949).
105. Bernard Bailyn tells us that the colonists interminably dwelt on power's
"endlessly propulsive tendency to expand itself beyond legitimate boundaries." BERNARD BAILYN,THE IDEOLOGICAL
ORIGINSOF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION
56 (1967);
see also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).
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Words were employed to keep the delegates from "mischief,"
Jefferson declared, by the "chains of the Constit~tion."'~~
Hence a written Constitution is subverted by a theory that
frees the justices to jettison the meaning attached by the Framers to their words in favor of the justices' own.
In a review of my Government by Judiciary in the London
Times, Max-now Lord-Beloff, a n Oxford emeritus and longtime student of American constitutionalism, wrote, "The quite
extraordinary contortions that have gone into proving the contrary make sad reading for those impressed by the high quality
of American legal-historical s~holarship."'~' Ackerman has
added an even more extraordinary chapter to such "scholarship."

4 JONATHAN
ELLIOT,
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATECONVENTIONS ON
FEDERAL
C O N ~ I O 440
N (1836).
M a x Beloff, Arbiters of America's Destiny, TIMES HIGHEREDUC. SUPP.(Lon107.
don), Apr. 7, 1978, at 11.
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